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Within the next couple of months, the Greek government, is supposed to persuade 
private creditors holding about EUR 200bn in its bonds to voluntarily exchange their 
existing bonds for new bonds that pay roughly 50 percent less.  This may work with 
large creditors whose failure to participate in a debt exchange could trigger a Greek 
default, but may not persuade smaller creditors, who will be told that their claims will 
continue to be fully serviced if they do not participate in the exchange. This paper 
proposes an approach to dealing with this free rider problem that exploits the fact that 
with some probability, the proposed exchange might be followed by an involuntary 
restructuring some time in the future. The idea is to design the new bonds that 
creditors are offered in the exchange in a way that make them much harder to 
restructure than the current Greek government bonds. This is easy to do because the 
vast majority of outstanding Greek government bonds lack standard creditor 
protections. Hence, creditors would be offered a bond that performs much worse than 
their current bond if things go according to plan, but much better if things do not. 
They will accept this instrument if (1) the risk of a new Greek debt restructuring in the 
medium term is sufficiently high; and (2) there is an expectation that the next 
restructuring probably will not be voluntary. 
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According to an understanding reached at the summit of European heads of 
government on October 26, 2011, the Greek government, within the next few months 
will attempt to persuade private creditors holding about EUR 200bn in its bonds to 
voluntarily take a 50 percent reduction of the face value of their bonds.  In a 
hypothetical scenario where all of the Greek bonds were held by a handful of big 
creditors, they could likely be persuaded to take the haircut. The argument would be 
that the failure to grant Greece relief would worsen its financial condition and 
eventually result in political chaos and default.  Under those conditions, creditors 
would be lucky to get anything close to 50 percent.  Arguments to that effect were 
made, often effectively, to persuade the holders of syndicated loans to Latin American 
sovereign debtors in the 1980s to voluntarily take significant reductions in their 
holdings.   
 
However, according to calculations by J.P. Morgan, only about EUR 120 bn of 
Greek government bonds are held by large institutional investors such as banks, 
pension funds, and insurance companies. This leaves up to EUR 80bn in the hands of 
asset managers, sovereign wealth funds, and some retail investors.  For the most part, 
these holders are seeking to maximize returns and have no desire to build reputations 
as co-operators with the Eurozone governments. The fact that roughly EUR 120 bn 
worth of bonds will be tendered by the big regulated holders means that Greece will 
come out of the exchange with a reduced debt load and will be better able to pay its 
creditors.  Under those conditions, the question for the non-institutional investors is: 
Why tender, especially if the exchange is voluntary in the sense that Greece is 
expected to continue its debt service to non-tendering creditors after the exchange?   
  
 Adding to the complications is that the border between the categories of a 
large regulated holder and holdouts is porous.  The large holders, once it becomes 
clear that the primary pressures to take the 50 percent cut are going to be their size 
and identities, will have an incentive to engage in arbitrage. The result will be that 
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more and more bonds will end up in the hands of those who can extract the highest 
value from engaging in a holdout strategy.  This is particularly true since the 
regulators in question (the ones who are supposed to apply the pressure on these 
institutions to take the 50 percent haircut) have conflicting incentives.  While they 
want these institutions to tender in the exchange, they also have an interest in the 
institutions being as financially strong as possible.  If selling on the open market to a 
hedge fund will yield a higher value, then there will be a temptation to allow at least 
the weakest of these institutions to sell.   
  
On the face of it, the proposal to do the Greek exchange on a voluntary basis 
seems to run into a devastating free rider problem. Free rider problems are not new in 
the context of debt exchanges – all bond exchanges since the Brady deals have had to 
deal with this problem in some form.
2
 However, the great majority of these exchanges 
addressed the problem by maintaining some ambiguity as to whether non-
participating creditors would in fact be repaid – that is, the exchanges were conducted 
under the threat of default.
3
 This approach has so far been ruled out for Greece. And, 
as of this writing, policy makers also appear reluctant to utilize any legal approach 
that involves a change in the payment terms of the bonds against the will of dissenting 
bondholders. In particular, this reduces the possibility of dealing with the free rider 
problem by “retrofitting” a collective action clause on the Greek bonds, which could 
be achieved through domestic Greek law.
4
   
 
This paper addresses the question of whether it is conceptually and legally 
possible to design the Greek debt exchange in a way that (i) is voluntary in the sense 
that the government promises to continue servicing its debt to creditors regardless of 
whether they accept the debt exchange offer or not; (ii) achieves a 50 percent 
“haircut” of the Greek debt and (iii) eliminates the free rider problem. The answer, 
after a lot of brain-racking, is a qualified Yes. We proceed in two stages. 
 
 We begin by asking what incentives a potential holdout might possibly have to 
accept a 50 percent haircut from a government that is at the same time 
reassuring him or her that it will continue honoring its debts in full even if the 
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creditor prefers to hold on to its old bonds. Indeed, a holder of Greek debt that 
matures soon is unlikely to have any such incentive. But a bondholder whose 
amortisation is still several years off might well have. The reason, ironically, 
is the possibility that even a 50 percent haircut of Greece’s privately held debt 
might not be enough to restore Greece to solvency. That is, with some 
probability, even a successful Greek debt exchange may be followed by an 
additional debt restructuring operation after a few years. If this probability is 
viewed as sufficiently high, and holders of the new Greek government debt 
offered in the exchange can expect to survive that second restructuring in 
much better shape than the holders of the old debt, this would remove the 
incentive to free ride. 
 Next, we ask whether there are ways in which the Greek government can 
design the new debt instruments to make them much more “restructuring 
proof” than the existing debt instruments. The answer turns out to be Yes, in 
part because the existing instruments offer virtually no creditor protection. We 
explore two approaches. The first is to legally subordinate the old instruments 
to the new ones – meaning that in the event of a new debt restructuring, the 
old instruments would be repaid only after the new instruments have been 
repaid in full. The problem with this approach is that it will constitute a default 
event under the terms of a standard sovereign Credit Default Swap (CDS) 
contract, which European policy makers have so far tried to avoid. The second 
approach is to subordinate the old instruments de facto but not de jure, by 
making the new instruments more difficult to restructure. This latter option 
would probably not trigger CDS contracts. 
 
In the section that follows, we first present a characterisation of the standard 
free rider problem in debt exchanges. We describe the way in which this is typically 
solved, the complications added by the requirement of voluntary participation, and 
whether and how these complications can be addressed in principle. We then go on to 
describe two legal strategies through which this solution could be implemented. 
Finally, we present some back-of-the-envelope calculations to establish whether the 
approach discussed might in fact be sufficient to dissuade free riders. The conditions 
under which this would be the case turn out to be stringent, but could be met, 
provided that investors expect any additional restructuring to be involuntary. The 
latter is plausible, if the current strategy to restore Greece to solvency falters in the 
near term.  Without new Greek borrowing from the private markets, the fraction of 
official sector debt in the Greek debt stock will likely continue to increase in the near 
term. Assuming that the official creditors remain unwilling to take a haircut, the 
private sector haircut required to restore solvency the next time around will be that 
much higher.   
 
 
A Framework for Thinking About Incentives to Free Ride 
  
A typical debt pre-default exchange offer – that is, one which does not 
necessarily insist on “voluntariness” in the sense defined in the introduction – tries to 
persuade creditors to tender using a version of the argument that a bird in hand is 
preferable to two in the bush. That is, the offer is designed to create a risk-return 
tradeoff. The new bond offered will typically be lower in net present value than the 
old bond if both are discounted at the same rate. However, accepting the new bond is 
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safer than holding on to the old bond, because there is ambiguity about whether the 
old bond will in fact be honored. As a result, the creditor that is trying to decide 
whether to accept the offer may find that the value of the new bond exceeds the 
expected value of the old bond. 
 
Figure 1 illustrates this simple decision problem from the perspective of a 
creditor who is small enough to free ride. If the creditor accepts the exchange offer, 
she receives a payoff 1-h per unit of the old bond tendered with probability 1, where h 
denotes the haircut suffered by tendering investors. If she rejects the offer, she will be 
repaid in full with some probability, denoted p.
5
 With probability 1-p, the debtor 
defaults, in which case the creditor receives some (low) recovery value vO < 1-h. The 
creditor accepts if 1-h ≥ p+(1-p) vO. That is, for a given haircut, the creditor accepts 
the offer if the probability of receiving full repayment on the old bonds is sufficiently 
low. 
 
Figure 1.  
 
 
Now, suppose that the debtor insists that the exchange is “voluntary” in the 
sense defined in the introduction, that is, it promises to service the debt of any holdout 
in full. Assume that this removes any ambiguity about whether the old debt will be 
repaid. In Figure 1, this would mean that p = 1. The implication is that for any h > 0, 
the exchange offer would always be rejected: clearly, a safe payment of 1 is 
preferable to a safe payment of 1-h.  Hence, if this is the right characterisation of the 
decision problem, then a “voluntary” haircut is inconsistent with a positive haircut. 
Making the offer “voluntary” removes any risk-return trade off. Rather than 
comparing a bird in hand with two in the bush, the creditor is faced with the choice of 
one bird in hand versus two birds in hand, and will always opt for the latter. 
 
However, Figure 1 embodies an assumption that makes it potentially 
misleading. The assumption is that participating creditors face no sovereign risk after 
having accepted the haircut h. In a case like Greece, which is unlikely to go back to its 
pre-crisis credit rating immediately even after a successful debt exchange involving a 
large haircut, this is surely too strong. Figure 2 describes the creditor decision 
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payoff 0 ≤ vO < 1 
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problem after this assumption is dropped, where 1-π denotes the sovereign risk 
associated with the new bonds, and vN the recovery value of the new bonds in the 
event of default. The decision rule for accepting the offer becomes: 
 
 π(1-h)+(1- π )vN ≥ p+(1-p) vO.  
 
Hence, the creditor’s decision will be influenced by the default risk and the 
recovery value of the new bonds as well as by the default risk and recovery value 
associated with the old bonds.  
 
 




The question is now what “voluntariness” of an exchange offer means in the 
framework described by Figure 2. The answer to this turns out to hinge on the 
maturity the old debt held by the prospective holdout creditor. 
 
 if the old debt is short term, in the sense that it comes due immediately 
or very soon after the debt exchange, then p = 1 arguably remains the 
right characterization of “voluntariness” from the perspective of a 
small creditor. That is, the sovereign promises to repay holdouts and 
does so, because the debt is in fact due more or less at the time of the 
promise. 
 if, however, the old debt is medium or long term, then it is subject to 
some default risk – just like the new debt. At most, the debtor can 
promise that the default risk faced by the hold out will be as low as the 
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In the case of Greece, just over EUR 34 bn of bond amortizations fall due in 
2012, out of the approximately EUR 257 bn due from end-2011 onward. This implies 




We now return to the title question of the paper: can a debt exchange offer be 
both voluntary and involve a haircut? The answer is No if the old debt is short term, 
but Yes in principle if it is not. Using p = π, the decision rule for accepting the debt 
exchange offer becomes:  
  
π ≤ (vN – vO) / (vN - vO + h)  
 
That is, for a given h > 0, a holder of medium or long term sovereign bonds 
might accept a debt exchange offer if: 
 
 the probability of full repayment π is sufficiently low, and 
 the recovery value associated with the new bonds, vN , is sufficiently 
high relative to the recovery value associated with the old bonds.  
  
To summarize: except for holders of very short term debt, the promise to 
continue servicing the old debts along with new bonds with lower debt service does 
not necessarily make holding out a dominant strategy, because there may be a state of 
the world where the new bonds perform better than the old bonds. As long as there is 
no default, the creditor is obviously better off by holding on to the old bonds. But if 
the new bonds have higher value in the event of a default or involuntary restructuring, 
and if the probability of such a restructuring is sufficiently likely, this will make the 
new bonds the “safer” option, and possibly more attractive than the old debt. 
 
The question, discussed in the next section, is what the debtor can do to ensure 
that the new bonds are, in fact, ”safer” in this sense.  
  
  
Legal Techniques to Maximise Participation in a Voluntary Debt Exchange 
 
The techniques discussed in this section exploit the fact that the vast majority 
of outstanding Greek bonds are domestically issued instruments that do not contain 
standard creditor protection clauses such as a “pari passu” clause prohibiting legal 
subordination, a “negative pledge clause” prohibiting the issuance of new 
collateralised debt unless existing debt is enhanced in the same way, and a cross-
default clause that defines a default on another government bond as a default event.
7
 
This is typical for the majority of the debt Eurozone countries issued after the 
adoption of the common currency, albeit with some variations across countries (Table 
1). As a result, it is relatively straightforward for the Greek sovereign to adopt 
measures that would put creditors in a better position to recover value in a future 
default if they choose to part with their existing instruments. 
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Ireland Yes No No No No No 
Belgium Yes Yes No No No Yes 
Greece Yes Yes No No No No 
Spain Yes No No No No Yes 
Portugal Yes No No No No Yes 
Italy Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
 
Source: The essential terms of the contracts were obtained from offering documents available on 
Thomson One Banker and Dealogic.   
 
Technique One: Legal Subordination 
 
 Pari passu clauses assure lenders that they will rank equally with the holders 
of all other unsubordinated debt.  This means that the sovereign debtor cannot take 
actions that have the effect of legally subordinating the holder of the bond that has a 
pari passu clause.  An example of such a subordination would be the sovereign 
passing a law saying that it will pay one set of creditors ahead of another set. In order 
to incentivize creditors to enter into its exchange offer in 2005, Argentina attempted 
to do something along these lines.  First, it announced in its exchange offer that it 
planned to service only the new bonds tendered in the exchange i.e. that it had no 
plans to resume debt service on any of the old bonds (which had been in default since 
the end of 2001).  Second, it passed a law (the “Padlock law”) that constrained it from 
negotiating a new deal with the bondholders who had not entered into the exchange.  




Ordinarily, sovereigns cannot take such actions because they have agreed to 
pari passu clauses in all of their bonds. Since the vast majority of Greek bonds, 
however, lack pari passu clauses, Greece can pass a law saying that the bondholders 
who exchange their bonds for the 50 percent haircut will have priority, in terms of 
getting paid first out of tax revenues, over the holders of Greek government bonds 
without pari passu clauses who do not tender. Such a law would be consistent with the 
contractual terms of Greek government bonds.  
 
Furthermore, legal subordination of this type may be consistent even with the 
spirit of a voluntary debt exchange. This is because (unlike the case of Argentina) the 
old bonds would continue be serviced as long as all goes according to plan – that is, 
holdouts would continue to get paid following the debt exchange. Indeed, if the 
combination of a debt exchange, fiscal adjustment and growth restore the 
sustainability of Greek debt, the old bondholders would get repaid in full. But the law 
could specify that in the event of a new debt restructuring, this would first affect the 
                                                 
8
 For more on the Padlock law, see Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, To Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank 
Pari Passu: That is the Question in Sovereign Bonds after the Latest Episode of the Argentine Saga. 75 
L. & BUS. REV. OF THE AMERICAS 745 (2009). A New York court, in late 2011, bought the argument 
that the Argentine Padlock law had indeed violated the pari passu clause.   
 9 
holders of the old bonds, and could only begin to affect the holders of the new debt if 




There is a question of whether subordination stipulated by domestic law, along 
the lines described above, would be credible.  From the perspective of 
committing a sovereign, domestic law is not a strong device. It could simply 
be changed in the future, lifting the requirement of legal subordination 
(although it is not clear why the government would want to do that). Hence, 
subordination is ultimately based on a government promise. The question is 
whether creditors would find this promise from the Greek government to be 
sufficiently credible such that few or no holders will be tempted to hold out. 
One argument might be that domestic political economy may generally work 
in favour of keeping such promises -- why treat a particular class of creditors 
better ex post if you have already told them and your voters that they will be 
subordinated?  
 
Second, legal subordination would trigger CDS contracts. One of the triggers 
in the standard sovereign CDS is an act of subordination (which we take to 
mean legal subordination). We do not take a position in this paper as to 
whether avoiding triggering CDS payouts is a good public policy objective or 
not – arguments can be made both ways.9 However, it seems clear that the 
desire to avoid triggering of CDS contracts is one of the main motivations 
what European policy have been insisting on “voluntary” exchanges. Hence, 
an attempt by Greece to formally subordinate its old bonds to new bonds 
would most likely run into resistance from the European Union partners 
backing its rescue package. 
 
Technique Two: Relative Difficulties of Restructuring 
 
 This technique – which as best as we can tell, would not trigger CDS contracts 
– is effectively a reverse engineered Exit Exchange offer. It will help, therefore, to 
first describe the Exit Exchange technique, which was originally devised as a means 
of deterring holdout creditors.
10
 (see Buchheit and Gulati, 2000). 
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may have been written by systemic financial players. Against this, it can been argued both that the 
outstanding net CDS exposures related to Greece appear to be small (about EUR 4bn) and that the 
failure to trigger CDS contracts in a debt restructuring involving a large haircut would result in even 
more contagion, as investors owning such protection with respect to other Eurozone countries realise 
that it is not effective, and seek to reduce their exposures directly.  In the same vein, it has been argued 
that that avoiding CDS protection in the case of Greece would do long-term damage to the CDS 
market, as it is demonstrated the CDS contract can be circumvented. However, the possibility of 
circumventing CDS contracts in the case of Greece may be an artefact of the divergence between 
default events as defined in the CDS contracts and creditor losses that can be imposed without a default 
event when government bonds lack proper creditor protections. Hence, it is well possible that newly 
issued CDS contracts will simply adapt to this fact, which may benefit the CDS market in the long run. 
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 The Exit Exchange technique was devised to tackle the difficulty created by 
the fact that sovereign bonds governed by New York law, prior to 2003, typically 
required unanimous approval from the bondholders before any reduction in payment 
terms on the bonds as a whole could occur.  Alterations of non-payment terms, 
however, could occur with something between a 50 percent and 66.67 percent vote 
typically.  The Exit Exchange technique took advantage of this latter characteristic of 
the bonds.  Once the approval of a large enough fraction of the bondholders to the 
proposed exchange was achieved, these holders would be given new bonds (with the 
agreed upon haircut) and in exchange, while handing in their old bonds, the old holder 
would agree to eliminate key contractual protections from the bonds that remained 
untendered (that is, the holdouts).  So, the holdouts could find themselves holding 
bonds with no negative pledge, pari passu, cross default, and acceleration provisions.  
They could also find their bonds delisted and governed by the law of some 
jurisdiction that would be unsympathetic to holdouts (e.g., the sovereign’s own 
courts).  The unattractiveness of being left holding the bag, so to speak, was enough to 
induce dramatically high participation rates in at least three exchanges that were done 
using this technique in Ecuador (2000), Uruguay (2003) and the Dominican Republic 
(2005). 
 
At bottom, the key to the success of the Exit Exchange technique is that no 
bondholder wants to be left holding a contract that has significantly worse contract 
rights than the others.  This is because, in the event of another financial crisis, it is the 
bonds with the weaker contract provisions that will both suffer first and the most. 
 
If the Exit Exchange technique were used with Greek government bonds (for 
example, with its small subset of English and Swiss law bonds), it would likely trigger 
the CDS contracts because the use of the Exit Consent technique would be viewed as 
inducing an involuntary exchange.  However, the large majority of Greece’s current 
bonds already have extremely weak contract provisions (no cross default, negative 
pledge, or pari passu) and are governed by the law of a jurisdiction likely to be 
sympathetic to the debtor and unsympathetic to holdouts.  In other words, there is no 
need to conduct exchange offer with the exchanging bondholders vote to worsen the 
contract protections of their brethren (and that is the arguably coercive and ugly part 
of an Exit Exchange offer).  In the Greek case, all that needs to be done is for the 
bondholders in the exchange to be given better terms.  If the exchanging bondholders 
are given new contracts that provide the comforting warmth of strong contract 
protections – modification terms with high vote thresholds (maybe an 85 percent 
requirement to alter payment terms in the future
11
), cross defaults, negative pledge 
clauses, pari passu provisions, foreign law, etc. – then that will make it perilous to 
remain out in the cold with a contract that provides no protection.  And the larger the 
number of bonds that move into the world of hard-to-restructure contracts, the greater 
the peril the holders of easy-to-restructure bonds will be in when and if Greece returns 
to financial distress.  Any bondholder doubting this reality has only to look back at the 
Brady restructurings of the 1980s where the sovereign bonds, especially those 
governed by New York law, were largely left untouched because of how difficult it 
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would have been to restructure them relative to the syndicated loans that constituted 
the majority of the sovereign debt then. In other words, while bonds were not legally 





    
For the foregoing to work, the holders of the current contract-lite Greek bonds 
have to fear that that there is a real likelihood that Greece might return to 
financial distress in the near future. As things stand, this scenario has some 
plausibility. The current deal gets Greece to only a debt to GDP ratio of 120 
percent, excluding the impact of collateral enhancements that might be given 
to these creditors or additions to the debt stock triggered by the need to 
recapitalise local banks.   
 
Further, holders of the current bonds have to believe that the next time around, 
the debt restructurers will not be constrained by instructions such as the 
exchange needs to be voluntary.  The pronouncements of the Eurogroup on 
November 28, 2010, when it was announced at all Eurozone sovereign bonds 
issued after June 2013 would contain CACs, arguably push in this direction.  
The recent EU summit on December 9,
 
2011 affirmed both that the Greek debt 
problem and the modalities to resolve it are viewed as “unique and 
exceptional” in Europe, and that CACs will be included in the terms and 
conditions of all new euro government bonds. 
 
Finally, the technique may not be sufficient to incentivize the roughly 7 
percent of Greek bondholders who already own English-law and Swiss-law 
bonds with all of necessary contract protections.  Other than (possibly) a 
higher voting threshold, the exchange would give them only what they already 
have. The fact that these holders cannot easily be pushed into the exchange, 
however, should remind the holders of domestic law bonds of the value of 
having bonds with strong contract protections.  
 
 
Would it Work? A Back-of-the-Envelope Calculation 
 
The final question that we seek to address is whether the incentive offered by 
making the new debt either legally or de-facto senior would be sufficiently strong to 
convince creditors to accept new debt instruments along the lines described in the 
October 26
th 
 Euro summit communiqué. This requires an estimate of what these 
instruments would be worth to investors in net present value terms compared to the 
old instruments that they would be tendering. Doing so is complicated by the fact that 
negotiations between Greece and creditor representatives have so far been 
inconclusive, so that no actual exchange offer has been published yet. However, we 
know that the Euro summit stipulated “a nominal discount of 50 percent on notional 
Greek debt held by private investors” and also set aside an official Eurozone 
contribution of EUR 30 bn, presumably to finance either a cash “sweetener” or the 
collateralisation of principal. Since the total volume of privately held Greek bonds is 
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in the order of EUR 200 bn, this implies that the bond offer is likely to contain either 
15 cents on the Euro in cash payouts, or alternatively collateralised principal worth 15 
cents on the Euro in net present value terms. 
 
For illustrative purposes, we focus on one specific proposal that was discussed 
between Greece and its creditors which meets these conditions, namely, a 20 year, 35 
percent amortizing discount bond with 10 years grace on principal, coupon of 5.6 of 
new principal, and an upfront cash payment of 15 percent of old principal. The sum of 
the cash payment and the face value of the new bond add up to 50 percent of the face 
value of the old bond, as required by the Eurozone summit. The question is what this 
bond would be worth to bondholders, on average, in net present value terms, and what 
the implicit net present value “haircut” is, defined as the percentage difference 




Table 2 contains the answer for three discount rate assumptions: 5 percent, 
which may be thought of as close to Greece’s typical medium term borrowing rate in 
normal times (assuming a future German Bund rate of about 3 percent, this 
corresponds to a spread of about 200 basis points); 9 percent (corresponding to the 
highest spreads suffered by Italy and Spain in the second half of 2011), and 13 
percent, which can be taken as representing the yield after a debt exchange that falls 
short of fully restoring fiscal credibility. The first line of the table shows the present 
value of the assumed new bonds using these discount rates uniformly for all 
payments. The second shows the “haircut” in the definition typically used by market 
practitioners, namely, 100 (the face value of the old bond) minus the present value of 
the new bond. Finally, the last line shows the net present value loss that the average 
bondholder would suffer by accepting the debt exchange, using the same discount rate 




Table 2. "Haircuts" Implicit in October 26, 2011 Debt 
Restructuring Parameters for Greece: Illustrative Example 1/ 
(in percent) 
     
 Assumed discount rate 
  5 9 13 
Value of new bonds 52.2 40.4 33.3 
"Market" haircut 47.8 59.6 66.7 
NPV haircut 48.0 52.2 54.6 
1/ Assumed terms for new bond: 20 year 35% amortizing discount bond with 10 
years grace on principal, coupon of 5.6% of new principal, and an upfront cash 
payment of 15% of old principal. Calculations assume that all Greek government 
bonds coming due after January 1, 2012 are tendered. Net present values 
computed on the basis of tendering on January 1, 2012. 
                                                 
13
 For a discussion of alternative approaches to computing “haircuts”, see Sturzenegger and 
Zettelmeyer, supra note 2; and Jeromin Zettelmeyer How to do a Sovereign Debt Restructuring in the 
Eurozone: Lessons from Emerging Market Debt Crises, in Guntram Wolff & William Cline (eds.), 
RESOLVING THE EUROPEAN DEBT CRISIS (2012). 
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 The fact that this “net present value” haircut is somewhat lower than the haircut in the definition of 
market practitioners is standard; this reflects the fact that the face value of the old bonds which is used 




The bottom line is that the 50 percent face value discount that the EU leaders 
committed to on the October 26
th
 summit is likely to translate into an average NPV 
haircut in about the same range, based on a plausible example of what the bond offer 
might look like, and a range of discount rate assumptions. Hence, for the purpose of 
the back-of-the-envelope calculation that follows, we treat face value and present 
value haircuts to be the same, i.e. we ignore any discounting for the purposes of this 
calculation.  
 
In line with Figure 2, we assume that there are two relevant states: one in 
which following the completion of the current exchange there is no further default or 
restructuring, assumed to happen with probability π, and one in which there is such a 
restructuring. If there is a new restructuring, it is assumed to happen fairly soon after 
the current debt exchange, so that any coupon payments to holders of both new or old 
bondholders between the time of the exchange and the new restructuring can be 
ignored.
15
 In this case, bondholders face a simple trade-off:  
 
 If they opt for the new bonds, they will receive a cash payout of 15 cents on 
one Euro of old principal immediately, and 35 cents later with probability π. 
With probability (1-π), i.e. in the event of a new restructuring, they will 
receive a recovery value of vNR  ≤ 35. 
 If they hold on to their old bonds, they will receive full repayment of 100 cents 
on the Euro with probability π, and a recovery value of vO  ≤ 100 if there is a 
new restructuring.  
 
As discussed before, the voluntariness of the exchange is expressed in the fact 
that the probability of receiving something less than the contractually promised terms, 
π, is the same regardless of whether bondholders chose to accept the exchange offer 
or not.  However, the recovery values of the new bonds and the old ones in the event 
of a future restructuring may be different.   
 
Absent any other incentive, a risk-neutral individual bondholder should opt for 
participation if:  
 
15 +  π*35 + (1- π)vNR  ≥ π*100 + (1- π)vO 
 
which can be rewritten as a condition on the probability that there will be no further 
restructuring, π: 
 
π ≤ [15 + vNR - vO]/ [65 + vNR - vO] 
 
                                                 
15
 If one assumes a longer intervening period, one would need to take into account that because of the 
principal reduction, coupon payments on the new debt are only about 40 percent (in absolute terms) of 
coupon payments on the old debt. An easy way of taking this into account in the back-of-the-envelope 
calculation is to express the cash payout received by the new bondholders net of this difference. For 
example, if there is one coupon payment in the intervening period, the holder of the new bond would 
receive 15 + 5.6*0.35 prior to the second restructuring, while she would have receive about 4.5 (the 
average coupon on the old debt) if she had hold on to the old bonds. The difference is 12.4. For a two- 
year intervening period, the difference would be about 9.8, and so on. 
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This formula states that to generate an incentive for small bondholders to 
accept the exchange, the probability π that there will be no future restructuring must 
not be higher than a particular threshold, which depends on the difference between the 
expected recovery values of the new and old bonds. The larger this difference, the 
higher the threshold probability can be.  
 
To obtain an intuition for what this means in practice, it is useful to consider 
some special cases: 
 
First, consider the case in which the expected recovery values of the new and 
old bonds are the same (this could be achieved, for example, through a law that says 
that in the event of a new restructuring, the face value of the remaining old bonds is 
written down first to that of the new bonds, before being serviced equally). In that 
case, π ≤ 15 / 65 = 0.23. This is perhaps an implausibly low probability of avoiding a 
new restructuring. Hence, merely promising to treat the old and then new debt the 
same in the event of a future debt restructuring is unlikely to be enough to ensure high 
participation. 
  
Second, we seek to establish the maximum value of π that would still avoid of 
free riding. This is obtained by setting vNR = 35 and vO = 0. Hence, πmax = 50/100 = 
0.50. This means that by setting vO sufficiently low relative to vNR, the exchange will 
succeed (in the sense of avoiding the free rider problem) as long as investors view the 
likelihood of a further restructuring to be at least 50 percent.  
 
Finally, consider an intermediate case. Pessimistic market observers have 
argued that the haircut suffered by private investors would need to be far higher, in 
the order of 80 percent, to restore Greece to solvency. Assuming some holdouts, 80 
percent is hence a plausible assumption for the maximum haircut that investors expect 
on the new debt in the event that a new restructuring is needed. Hence vNR ≥ 20. 
Suppose now that the old debt is strictly subordinated to the new debt (legally or de 
facto) in a new restructuring. Since the new debt would not be repaid in full in the 
event of a new restructuring, this means vO = 0. Using the minimum recovery value of 
vNR = 20 for the participating bondholders implies p ≤ 35 / 85 = 0.41 – not an 
unreasonable level, given the political and economic uncertainty prevailing in Greece 
and Europe at the moment. Importantly, this level could be higher if investors are risk 
averse, since risk averse investors will particularly value the fact that acceptance of 
the exchange offer implies a “bird in hand” (15 cents on the dollar of cash right away, 
plus 35 if they are lucky) rather than “two birds in the bush” (100 cents on the dollar 
if they are lucky). 
 
The back-of-the-envelope calculations above are for the average bondholder. 
Short term bondholders (on a residual maturity basis) will face higher haircuts – in the 
order of 67 percent – but as already argued, they will in any case have no incentive to 
tender if the success in the exchange rules out an involuntary restructuring for about 
one year. Note also that the calculations above assume that the bondholder that needs 
to be persuaded to join the exchange does not enjoy CDS protection. For a CDS-
protected creditor, vO = 100, since the creditor will collect full repayment in the event 
of an involuntary restructuring. Hence, rejecting the debt exchange offer is a dominant 
strategy: regardless of whether or not a further restructuring materialises, the investor 
expects to be repaid in full. However, the volume of CDS protection written for 
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Greece is limited (with reportedly about EUR 4bn of net exposure), and the horizon of 
some of this protection is likely to be short, as very little new protection is likely to 
have been written in the last two years.  
 
Hence, under the assumptions made, perhaps up to EUR40 bn of debt would 
still not be tendered. Hence, “success” in this exchange means a participation rate of 





The notion of a voluntary debt exchange with a 50 percent haircut seems 
oxymoronic. Why would investors – or at least small investors, that individually have 
no impact on the success of the exchange – voluntarily accept a 50 percent write-
down of their claims?  
 
This paper has shown that in the special circumstances of Greece, there may 
nonetheless be a way of designing debt exchange offer that meets these seemingly 
contradictory objectives. This possibility arises due to three facts, which jointly make 
the Greek case fairly unique. 
 
First, under the terms of the debt restructuring envisaged in the October 26, 
2011 EU Summit declaration, Greek debt might become manageable, but would 
remain high, at 120 percent of GDP. As a result, there is a possibility that Greece may 
be faced with future debt distress even if it achieves a 50 percent haircut with large 
creditor participation. Such a situation is very likely to result in an involuntary 
restructuring. The reason for this is that – as private sector debt is gradually repaid 
and replaced with IMF-EU debt – the private sector haircut required to restore Greece 
to solvency would no longer be achievable using a voluntary approach.    
 
Second, although some of the outstanding Greek debt will come due in 2012, 
most will not. Hence, in the event that a second restructuring is required in 2013 to 
restore Greece to solvency, most of the holders of current Greek debt would be “hit”.  
The same would be true (with less force) if a new restructuring were to happen in 
2014. When deciding whether or not to tender their debt in the voluntary exchange 
that is currently envisaged, most investors hence need to worry not just about the 
haircut associated with that exchange, but also about how they might fare in the event 
of a new restructuring. 
 
Third, most outstanding Greek government bonds are domestic law bonds that 
offer minimal creditor protections: no pari passu clause, no negative pledge clause, no 
cross-default clause. The implication of this is that in the event of an involuntary 
restructuring they would offer minimal creditor protection. 
 
The implication of these three facts is both that it is easy to design new Greek 
bonds that do much better in protecting the creditor in the event of a Greek default 
than most of the currently outstanding instruments, and that Greek bond holders 
should take this extra protection seriously. In the presence of bonds that are much 
harder to restructure – because they are issued under foreign jurisdiction and expose 
the sovereign to litigation in the even of an involuntary restructuring – the holders of 
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current Greek government bonds may well bear the brunt of a future restructuring. 
Even if they are not subordinated de jure, they may find themselves subordinated de 
facto.  
 
Back of the envelope calculations suggest that avoiding this risk, together with 
a 15 percent cash payout (or equivalently, collateralisation of principal in the same 
amount) offered to accepting creditors, may generate sufficiently strong incentive to 
make creditors accept a 50 percent debt exchange offer – provided that the risk of a 
new restructuring is viewed as sufficiently high, in the order of at least 50 percent. 
 
Hence, the answer to the question of why creditors might be willing to 
voluntarily accept a 50 percent haircut is: “Because in a situation of high uncertainty 
and continued sovereign risk, switching into new bonds that give investors 15 cents 
on the Euro in cash and at the same time put them in a better position to recover value 
in a default might be more attractive than holding on to the current debt.”  
 
Ironically, it is the lack of faith of the market that a reduction of the Greek 
public debt ratio to 120 percent is enough to make Greece’s debt sustainable that may 
help to make Greece’s latest plan work. If offered new bonds with stronger creditor 
protections and a cash payout, this lack of faith may lead to high creditor participation 
even in a voluntary bond exchange involving a high haircut. After that exchange, 
Greece will still face an uphill battle if it wants to avoid a further restructuring. But 
contrary to a situation when creditor participation in the initial exchange is low, it is a 
battle that it might win. 
 
 
 
